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2005. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Competition law in the European Union (EU) has two equally important objec-
tives. One aim is to encourage competition among ﬁrms, which is presumed to
achieve maximum consumer beneﬁts. The second is to protect the unimpeded
functioning of the EU’s single market, by both reducing costs of engaging in
intra-market trade and safeguarding the legality of arbitrage through parallel
imports. Firms are not permitted to partition the European market, nor to dis-
criminate among consumers based on their nationality or location. This latter
imperative in European law is based on the underlying presumption that mar-
ket integration is central for enhancing competition. Thus, these two objectives
generally are seen to be in concert with one another.
Similar comments apply to U.S. case law, emanating from interpretations of
the Robinson-Patman Act, which regulates price discrimination. In the United
States manufacturers frequently use independent distributors, who are typically
awarded exclusive territories within regions or states. The Robinson-Patman
Act places some restrictions on the ability of original manufacturers to charge
diﬀerent wholesale prices to diﬀerent distributors. Those manufacturers might
wish to do so to cope with the problem of gray-market trade, which is unau-
thorized trade across territories in parallel channels. That trade reﬂects the
signiﬁcant integration of regional markets within the country, itself a goal en-
shrined in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, and competition law seeks
to safeguard that integration.
To clarify, parallel imports (PI) are goods placed legitimately onto the mar-
ket in one country but subsequently imported into another country without the
authorization of the holder of intellectual property protection (patent, copyright,
or trademark) in the latter market. The legality of this activity depends on the
point at which the original ﬁrm’s rights to control redistribution are exhausted
under the law. The European Union has adopted a rigorous regime of regional
exhaustion, which states that PI are impermissible from outside the commu-
nity but ﬁrst sale of a good within its territory, whether to distributors or ﬁnal
consumers, exhausts the original manufacturer’s distribution rights. The U.S.
policy of national exhaustion is essentially the same and redistribution rights
are ended upon ﬁrst sale anywhere within the country. Thus, parallel trade
within the EU, and gray-market trade within the United States, are seen as a
key form of integrating markets through legal arbitrage.
In fact there are circumstances in which consumer gains and market integra-
2tion can come into conﬂict. In particular, as discussed in the next section, EU
case law rigorously defends the single market both by discouraging wholesale
price discrimination across markets and upholding the ability of parallel trading
companies to engage in commodity arbitrage. The United States is somewhat
more forgiving of price diﬀerentiation but still limits its scope in order to pre-
serve competition. To analyze these trade-oﬀs we set out a model in which an
original manufacturer has at its disposal just two instruments, the wholesale
prices it can charge its independent distributors in two diﬀerent markets. That
price ﬂexibility is central in managing a variety of ineﬃciencies that emerge in
the presence of parallel trade. A policy requiring uniform wholesale charges
reduces the number of instruments from two to one, making the problem more
diﬃcult for the manufacturer and potentially raising ineﬃciencies on the re-
tail markets. Indeed, we ﬁnd relevant market circumstances under which the
uniform-price policy generates higher retail prices in both markets than would
be the case with discriminatory prices, harming consumer welfare.
Thus, in this paper we analyze, within a model of integrated wholesale mar-
kets and vertical pricing, conditions under which the single-market objective
is compatible with the goal of raising consumer welfare and conditions under
which it is not. We are particularly interested in the issue of wholesale price
discrimination and the eﬀect it has on arbitrage between markets and on sub-
sequent retail prices. The situation we have in mind involves a manufacturing
ﬁrm with monopoly rights to distribute some good over which it owns intellec-
tual property rights (IPR) in two markets. This ﬁrm sets non-linear prices, in
the form of two-part tariﬀs, to its distributors in these countries. Because these
prices are the control instruments available for the ﬁrm, their proﬁt-maximizing
levels likely are diﬀerent across markets. Thus, the manufacturer has an incen-
tive to discriminate in prices at the distributor level, a strategy that can reduce
the volume of trade through parallel channels.
In our model we explore the impact of permitting parallel imports in the
presence of wholesale price discrimination, on the one hand, and uniform pricing,
on the other hand. Because manufacturing ﬁr m sp l a c eg o o d so nt h em a r k e t
initially through vertical contracts with local distributors, it is important to
study the implications of diﬀerent competition policy regimes in this context.
Both permission of PI and mandatory uniform prices are forms of competition
policy but they have not before been studied in a framework involving vertical
distribution and pricing. That is our objective in this paper and we ﬁnd that
there may be fundamental inconsistencies in the two regimes. We show that a
3policy requiring the manufacturing ﬁrm to charge nondiscriminatory prices can
result in retail prices that are higher in all markets compared to an equilibrium
with price discrimination. We also show that a policy of requiring uniform
wholesale prices across locations would push retail prices toward convergence
as transportation costs fall but this may not be optimal for welfare. More
precisely, we demonstrate that, for a relevant range of trade costs, consumers
in both markets can beneﬁt jointly if policy permits the manufacturing ﬁrm to
price discriminate among distributors.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂyo v e r v i e wr e l e v a n t
EU and U.S. case law. In Section 3 we present our model and in Section 4
we undertake theoretical analysis of the various policy regimes with one-way
parallel trade. In Section 5 we extend the analysis to two-way trade. Concluding
remarks are oﬀered in Section 6.
2 European Union and United States Case Law
Parallel trade emerges from international price diﬀerences, which could exist at
the wholesale level due to the strategic decisions of IPR holders. However, EU
law prohibits certain types of price discrimination by a monopolist, speciﬁcally
if the strategy puts one trading partner (e.g., a distributor or parallel-trading
concern) at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other trading partners. Article
82 of the EC Treaty states that price discrimination of this kind is abusive and
illegal per se. Pricing that is harmful to the single market is considered to be a
particularly serious infringement of Article 82 and prices charged to prevent or
limit the scope for parallel trade are condemned.
The relevant European case law can be summarized in three principles
(Whish, 2003). First, a monopolist cannot charge excessive prices or fees to
impede parallel imports. This principle was established in the British Leyland
(BL) case in 1984. Beginning in 1981 BL had refused to certify imported auto-
mobiles of its manufacture for use on British roads then later charged a fee of
150 pounds sterling for a certiﬁcate of conformity, where it charge 25 pounds
sterling for a domestically purchased car. The European Commission found
that BL, which was a dominant ﬁrm, abused its position both in refusing certi-
ﬁcation and charging diﬀerentially higher fees to parallel importing ﬁrms, with
those fees being disproportionate to the value of the service provided.1 The
1See 84/379/EEC: Commission Decision of 2 July 1984 relating to a proceeding under
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (IV/30.615 - BL).
4prices impeded parallel trade and were, consequently, illegal.
Second, a monopolist can discriminate in prices across geographical markets
only to a limited extent and the diﬀerence in prices must be "objectively" jus-
tiﬁed. This principle ﬁnds its roots in Article 82 of the EC Treaty, which states
that an abuse of dominant position may consist in "directly or indirectly impos-
ing unfair purchasing or selling prices to other companies." In United Brands the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that, among other abuses of dominant
position, the defendant acted illegally by charging diﬀerent prices to distributors
depending on the ﬁnal destination of its product.2 In particular, UBC sold ba-
nanas in bulk to distributors in various member states at two central locations
(Rotterdam and Bremerhaven), charging diﬀerent prices to wholesalers from dif-
ferent countries. UBC argued that those prices were justiﬁed by being directly
linked to ﬁnal market prices for bananas in each country. The ECJ found that
UBC was entitled to take local market conditions into account only to a limited
extent, for the risks arising from local market conditions were borne by local
distributors and retailers, whereas UBC was selling a homogeneous product in a
centralized location. Thus, charging segmented prices based on geographical lo-
cation was an abuse of pricing power and limited cross-border trade. Note that
this case turned on prices being charged without suﬃcient relation to UBC’s
production cost. Thus,in the same case the ECJ held that evidence of abuse
may be found by comparing price with production cost of a product. Because
of the practical diﬃculty of computing production cost, the Court later deter-
mined in Tournier that such an assessment could be made by comparing the
prices charged for the same product or service on other geographic markets,
an item of direct relevance for PI.3 Similarly, in Tetra Pak II the Court found
that the considerable price discrimination across Member States undertaken by
the defendant, a dominant ﬁrm in materials for packaging liquid foods, was an
abuse of position and incompatible with the single market.4 It could not be ob-
jectively attributed to market conditions for the relevant market was the entire
EU and transport costs in the industry were low. Thus, the price discrimination
was found to be a strategy to partition markets, violating Article 62.
Third, it is illegal for a monopolist to practice price discrimination by grant-
ing rebates to distributors in a way that impedes growth of competition, as the
2Case 27/76, United Brands, ECR 207, 1978.
3Case 395/87, Tournier, ECR 1988.
4Case ECR I-5951, Tetra Pak II, November 1996.
5ECJ found in Irish Sugar.5 In particular, the discriminatory "border rebates"
oﬀered by the ﬁrm to customers located close to the Northern Ireland border
were found to put those who did not quality for them at a competitive disad-
vantage. According to the ECJ, competition spillovers across borders are the
essence of a common market and rebates that target competition from imports
or exports are incompatible with Article 82. Similarly, in Michelin II the court
found that a distributor-speciﬁc rebate scheme impeded access of other tire com-
panies to the Netherlands market.6 Thus, rebates designed by a dominant ﬁrm
to discourage cross-border purchases within the EU are illegal.
Turning to the United States, the legality of price discrimination is based
on the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 and subsequent guidelines issued by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In essence, this act bars setting price dif-
ferences across customers if doing so constitutes an anti-competitive practice
that injures competition. In subsequent interpretation, the courts have clariﬁed
that conditions of competition are paramount and that price discrimination that
arises from legitimate cost diﬀerences or that otherwise does not interfere with
other antitrust principles is acceptable. The Supreme Court has recognized that
overly strict interpretations of Robinson-Patman could result in price uniformity
and rigidity that itself may cause problems for competition.7
This stance implies that price diﬀerentiation is likely to run afoul of the
courts primarily where it threatens to injure competition. In the principal case
to date, a tobacco company was accused of violating the law by giving volume
discounts for generic cigarettes to some wholesalers and not to others, where
those discounts could be expected to reduce distributor costs in a predatory
way and drive distributors of other ﬁrms out of business.8 While stipulating
again that such price setting might be illegal, the Supreme Court found for the
defendant because the plaintiﬀ could not demonstrate a causal link to reduced
competition and injury.
In a case similar to United Brands i nt h eE U ,t h eS u p r e m eC o u r tr u l e di n
Texaco v. Hasbrouck that for an original ﬁrm to charge diﬀerent wholesale (or
retail) prices to its distributors (retail stores), it must be able to demonstrate
with rigorous accounting that the price diﬀerential precisely reﬂects the addi-
5Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar plc, October 1999.
6Case T-201/01, Michelin II, September 2003.
7Great Atlantic and PaciﬁcT e aC o .vF T C , 440 U.S. 69 No. 77-564 (1979).
8Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation, 509 U.S. 209, No.
92-466 (1993).
6tional costs of selling to varying customers.9 In this case Texaco sold gasoline
to two distributors at a price that was 3.7 to 6.0 cents per gallon lower than
the "retail tank wagon" price at which it sold to 12 independent retailers in a
particular locality. Texaco argued that it provided this "functional discount" to
distributors to compensate them for the cost of building local distribution mar-
kets. The Supreme Court upheld lower-court verdicts against Texaco, ﬁnding
that the defendant could not demonstrate a compelling cost-based reason for
doing so and that competition had been injured.
On the basis of such ﬁndings it is fair to say that U.S. authorities uphold a
policy barring price discrimination at the distributor level unless manufacturers
can demonstrate a cost-based reason for it, but only if there is demonstrable
injury to competition. The EU takes a more rigorous stance against such dis-
crimination, though there remain exceptions (Geradin and Petit, 2007).
3 A Theoretical Model of Cross-border Trade
Our model builds on earlier work analyzing PI in a model of vertical price con-
trol.10 This approach was ﬁrst set out by Maskus and Chen (2002) and Chen and
Maskus (2005) and further developed by Ganslandt and Maskus (2007). They
develop a simple model of vertical price control in which an original manufac-
turer sets wholesale prices to either one or two distributors, with the possibility
of PI from one market to the other. As noted in those papers there are three
essential eﬃciency trade-oﬀs in this model. The manufacturer has to balance
the losses from a pro-competitive price eﬀect of parallel imports, the resource
costs wasted in the activity of cross-border trade, and the double-markup prob-
lem in inducing a proﬁt-maximizing retail price in the export market. Empirical
evidence in Maskus and Chen (2002) and Ganslandt and Maskus (2003) points
to vertical control problems as an important determinant of parallel trade.11
Perhaps the most closely related study is by Matsumura (2003). Using a
spatial location model, he found that an upstream monopolist wishes to limit
competition between two downstream duopolists by using exclusive territories.
9Texaco v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, No. 87-2048 (1990).
10The other basic theory of PI considers simple arbitrage against retail prices. See Hilke
(1988), Malueg and Schwartz (1994), and Richardson (2002). Ganslandt and Maskus (2004)
ﬁnd empirical evidence that PI in pharmaceuticals aﬀects pricing power in Sweden.
11A study by National Economic Research Associates (1999) reported survey evidence of
signiﬁcant ﬂows of parallel trade within the European Union in the early 1990s. While the
report tended to focus on retail price diﬀerences, it pointed out that the bulk of parallel trade
happens at the wholesale or distributor level.
7However, the existence of exclusive territories actually reduces ﬁnal-product
prices in local markets when distributors compete in quantities, because it in-
duces lower wholesale prices in the ﬁrst place.12
In the model that follows we extend the vertical price control framework
to consider the implications of competition-policy restrictions on pricing by the
manufacturer. While we describe the model generally in terms of EU exhaustion
policy permitting PI across national borders, the insights apply equally to gray-
market trade across exclusive territories within the United States.
3.1 Basic assumptions
A manufacturer, M, sells its product in two markets, called A and B.F i r mM
sells its product through an independent exclusive distributor in each market.
The demand in market A is
X =1− pA, (1)
and that in B is
Y = S (1 − bpB). (2)
It is assumed throughout the paper that demand in market B is more price-
elastic than demand in market A, i.e. b>1. It is also assumed that market B
is larger, i.e. S ≥ 1. More precisely, market B is suﬃciently large to ensure that
it is proﬁtable for the manufacturing ﬁrm to serve both markets in equilibrium.
Manufacturer M has a constant marginal cost of production, which is c.T h e
marginal cost of retailing in both countries is normalized to zero. Retail markets
are segmented through much of the analysis, though we consider retail arbitrage
late in the paper.13
Suppose that the manufacturing ﬁrm M can oﬀer the distributor in market
i (i = A,B) any contract in the form of (wi,T i), where wi is the wholesale price
and Ti is a transfer payment (franchise fee) from the distributor to M.T h e
12Raﬀ and Schmidt (2005) analyze the implications of exclusive territories used by ﬁrms
in international trade. They concluded that trade liberalization may lead manufacturers
to oﬀset the loss of tariﬀ barriers with contracts imposing exclusive territories, which may
decrease competition and welfare.
13As argued in Ganslandt and Maskus (2007), this segmentation of consumer markets at
the retail level can be motivated on several grounds. In some industries consumer arbitrage
is illegal, while parallel trade at the wholesale level is permitted. This is the case with
prescription drugs in the European Union for instance. In other industries, physical products
and non-tradeable services are tied, causing eﬀective market segmentation at the retail level.
Local warranties bundled with capital goods and local plans bundled with cell phones are
examples in this category. Finally, retail arbitrage can be prohibitively costly, while margins
permit parallel trade at the wholesale level.
8manufacturing ﬁrm cannot prevent either distributor from selling the product
also in the other market, either directly or through intermediaries, such as ﬁrms
specialized in parallel trade. That is, we assume that either M cannot legally
limit the distributor’s territory of sales, or it is too costly for M to enforce any
such constraint. The manufacturing ﬁrm can only control supply with wholesale
prices. We rule out contracts that incorporate an agreement to limit the volume
of parallel trade directly or indirectly.14
With this setup, suppose that the distributor incurs an additional constant
marginal cost t ≥ 0 in selling the good in the market where it is not located.
For instance, t could be the transaction cost or the transportation cost. Finally,
assume that if the distributor sells in the market where it is not located, it
competes with the local distributor in a Cournot fashion. Let the quantities
sold in A by the two distributors be xA and xB, respectively, and the quantity
sold in B be yA and yB. Subscripts refer to the identity of the distributor.
A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is two pairs (xA,x B) and (yA,y B) that
constitute Nash equilibria for any (wi,T i) for i = A,B, together with an optimal
choice of (wi,T i) for i = A,B by the manufacturing ﬁrm. Let w denote the vector
(wA,w B) and T denote the vector (TA,T B).
Our main objective is to analyze how the manufacturing ﬁrm sets the whole-
sale prices and the transfer payments to maximize its proﬁt. The manufacturing
ﬁrm’s proﬁti se q u a lt ot o t a lr e v e n u e si ne q u i l i b r i u mm i n u sr e a lc o s t si n c u r r e d .
More precisely, the objective of the manufacturing ﬁrm is to maximize:
max
wA,wB
X (pA)(pA − c)+Y (pB)(pB − c) − t(yA + xB). (3)
where the ﬁrst term on the right hand side is the total revenue (operating proﬁt)
in market A, the second term is the total revenue (operating proﬁt) in market
B and the third term is the real cost of cross-border trade.
We initially derive the equilibrium of the model under two policy regimes.
The ﬁrst case is referred to as "discriminatory wholesale pricing". When dis-
criminatory pricing is permitted, the manufacturing ﬁrm can set one wholesale
price for each distributor and wholesale prices can potentially diﬀer. The second
case is referred to as "uniform wholesale pricing". In this case the manufactur-
ing ﬁrm is required to charge the same wholesale price in both markets to ensure
that neither distributor is put at a competitive disadvantage in relation to the
other.
14As discussed by Ganslandt and Maskus (2007), such contracts would be illegal in the EU.
9Initially we make the assumption that only distributor B can engage in cross-
border trade. Consequently, distributor A can sell only in its home market while
distributor B can choose to sell in both markets. There are several practical
justiﬁcations for this assumption of one-way trade. First, if there are ﬁxed costs
(not explicitly modeled in this paper) and market B is small while market A
is large, an asymmetry is possible, with products ﬂowing from the small to the
large country but not the other way around. Portugal and the United Kingdom
within the European Union would exemplify this case. Second, there may be
asymmetric product standards between the two countries. Third, the countries
may vary in their legal treatment of PI, with international exhaustion the rule in
A and national exhaustion in B. Examples of the former are Australia and Hong
Kong, which are open to PI in copyright goods, and examples of the latter are
Japan and the United States, which are not. Still, this is a restrictive assumption
and later we extend the analysis to permit two-way trade at the wholesale level.
As we shall see this gives further insights but makes the analysis substantially
more complex.
We assume that the marginal cost of production is suﬃciently high to ensure
that the manufacturing ﬁrm’s optimal wholesale price in equilibrium is non-
negative15 and suﬃciently low to ensure that there is positive demand in both







We analyze equilibria where the unit trade cost can be suﬃciently low to po-
tentially permit cross-border trade in equilibrium.
In the subsequent analysis, we compare the outcome with cross-border trade
to an equilibrium that is segmented, either due to a prohibitive trade cost or
contracts that eﬀectively allocate an exclusive territory to each distributor. In
the segmented equilibrium, the manufacturing ﬁrm can set wholesale prices and
ﬁxed fees in each market to avoid a double-markup problem and to induce
optimal retail prices. In this case the wholesale prices are, accordingly, equal to
the marginal cost of production, i.e. wi = c, and the retail prices correspond to
15This is an important assumption for the results as we show in Ganslandt and Maskus
(2007).











We shall refer to this case as our benchmark equilibrium. In the segmented
equilibrium, the retail price in market A exceeds the retail price in market B,
reﬂecting the less price-elastic demand in the former market. It follows that





We label trade costs in this high range "prohibitive".
4 Cross-border trade
4.1 The sub-game retail equilibrium
The next task is to analyze the eﬀects of cross-border trade. Before we analyze
the manufacturing ﬁrm’s optimal behavior it is useful to derive the sub-game
retail equilibrium. A common feature of the three cases we shall analyze below
is that market segmentation is imperfect. The manufacturing ﬁrm can neither
directly nor indirectly impose exclusive territories. Recall that both distributors
can sell in market A, while only the local distributor can sell in market B.
More precisely, in the retail sub-game the manufacturing ﬁrm has oﬀered two
contracts, {TA,w A} and {TB,w B}, that have been accepted by the distributors.
The distributors non-cooperatively set quantities in a Cournot-fashion in market
A and the local distributor chooses a proﬁt-maximizing quantity in market B.
The sub-game equilibrium in market A is consequently given by the well-known
Cournot output
xA =




1+wA − 2wB − 2t
3
(9)
subject to the condition that wholesale prices are such that equilibrium quan-
tities are non-negative. Similarly, the sub-game equilibrium quantity in market







The corresponding retail price in markets A and B are, respectively,
pA =







For a suﬃciently high trade cost, above a threshold denoted e t, parallel trade
is unproﬁtable in equilibrium. In other words, the equilibrium is arbitrage-
free. More precisely, cross-border trade is blocked if the manufacturing ﬁrm
sets wholesale prices that satisfy the no-arbitrage condition
1+wA
2
≤ wB + t. (13)









This is a suﬃcient characterization of the sub-game equilibrium for our pur-
poses. We can now proceed to the analysis of the manufacturing ﬁrm’s behav-
ior under diﬀerent institutional assumptions. First, we analyze wholesale price
discrimination under the assumption that the producer is allowed to set one
wholesale price for each distributor but is not permitted to restrict cross-border
trade through any direct contractual means. Second, we investigate the eﬀects
of uniform pricing, based on the policy presumption that price discrimination
that puts one trading partner at a competitive disadvantage is illegal. Thus,
the producer must set one uniform wholesale price for both distributors.
4.2 Discriminatory Wholesale Pricing (D)
We start our analysis with wholesale price discrimination. For this purpose we
assume that the manufacturing ﬁrm can set one price for each distributor. In
this case the manufacturing ﬁrm has two instruments with which to solve three
12problems: inducing the proﬁt-maximizing retail price in each market and en-
suring an eﬃcient global distribution by minimizing cross-border parallel trade,
which wastes resources. Since the producer has too few instruments we shall
expect ineﬃciencies and a sub-optimal outcome compared to exclusive territo-
ries.
The manufacturing ﬁrm set wholesale prices to maximize total proﬁts
max
wA,wB
X (w)(pA (w) − c)+Y (w)(pB (w) − c) − txB (w), (16)
where the last term on the right hand side is the resources used in trade from
market B to A.N e x t ,w eﬁnd the equilibrium under two possible price-setting
strategies: wholesale prices that permit PI and wholesale prices that block PI
(we shall refer to the latter as arbitrage-free prices). We derive the optimal
wholesale prices and compare the producer’s proﬁti nb o t ho ft h e s ec a s e st oﬁnd
t h em o r ep r o ﬁtable strategy.
The optimal wholesale prices that permit cross-border trade can be found
by solving the following two ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to wA and wB















The ﬁrst term on the left hand side of both conditions is the pro-competitive
eﬀect in market A (which we term the horizontal externality between the com-
peting distributors because it reduces the manufacturer’s proﬁt). The second
terms in both equations are the eﬀects of costly cross-border trade (which we
term ineﬃcient distribution). The third term on the left hand side of the sec-
ond condition, with respect to wB, is the double-markup problem in market B
(which we term the vertical externality between the distributor and the manu-
facturing ﬁrm).
Note that for t =0the second terms are zero and the total number of prob-
lems for the manufacturing ﬁrm is two, the same as the number of instruments
available. In this case the wholesale prices are perfect substitutes for inducing
the proﬁt-maximizing monopoly retail price in market A.T h eo p t i m a lr e t a i l
price in market B must, however, be induced solely with the wholesale price to
the local distributor there. The unique wholesale price that solves the vertical
externality equals the marginal cost of production. The manufacturing ﬁrm can
13thus obtain the same proﬁt as a vertically integrated monopolist by combining
the two wholesale prices to solve both the horizontal and vertical problems in
this case.
If the trade cost is positive, however, there is an additional distortion that
prohibits the manufacturing ﬁrm from obtaining the ﬁrst-best outcome in retail
markets. The manufacturing ﬁrm must therefore balance the trade-oﬀsa m o n g
the horizontal externality in market A,t h ei n e ﬃciency in distribution and the
vertical externality in market B.
The severity of the problem with ineﬃcient parallel trade increases in the
trade cost. For a suﬃciently high trade cost, above a threshold denotede tD(derived
below), it is proﬁtable for the manufacturing ﬁrm to set arbitrage-free wholesale
prices. These are prices that make cross-border trade unproﬁtable in equilib-
rium. Accordingly, to block PI the manufacturing ﬁrm sets wholesale prices
that satisfy the no-arbitrage condition
1+wA
2
≤ wB + t. (19)
The producer’s proﬁtc a nb ed i ﬀerentiated subject to this condition. We obtain
the following ﬁrst-order condition for wholesale prices that block parallel trade




where the ﬁrst term on the left hand side is the horizontal externality in market
A and the second term is the vertical problem in market B.T h e ﬁrst-order
condition gives the proﬁt-maximizing wholesale price in B while the wholesale
price in A can be obtained from the no-arbitrage condition.
If we solve for the vectors of wholesale prices that permit and block PI we
obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 Assume that the trade cost is non-prohibitive and the producer











B = c +
2t
Sb
for t ≤ e tD, (22)
wD
A =





2+2 c + Scb− 4t
4+Sb
for t>e tD, (24)
and the equilibrium is unique.
The equilibrium volume of cross-border trade can be obtained by inserting
the equilibrium wholesale prices for low trade costs
¡
t ≤ e tD¢
,g i v e nb y(21),i n









which decreases in the unit trade cost, t. Parallel trade consequently occurs in
equilibrium for low trade costs, while the equilibrium is arbitrage-free for higher





which is strictly positive and below the prohibitive trade cost.
A closer look at the equilibrium reveals that the wholesale price in market A
ﬁrst falls as trade cost increases in the low range (t ≤ e tD), then rises as the unit
trade cost goes beyond the threshold level. In contrast, the wholesale price in
market B ﬁrst increases and then decreases. The result for the low-cost range
(t ≤ e tD) is intuitive since the manufacturing ﬁrm would reduce the price in A
and raise the price in B to moderate the negative eﬀect of costly cross-border
trade. This incentive becomes stronger as trade costs rise. Indeed, note from





where superscript S refers to "subsidy", the manufacturing ﬁrm prefers to set
a wholesale price in market A, i.e. wA, that is below marginal cost. This
would imply a decision to subsidize the distributor in market A,w h i c hw o u l d
15be proﬁtable for the manufacturing ﬁrm because it makes that distributor more
aggressive and reduces the volume of ineﬃcient trade.
4.3 Uniform Wholesale Pricing (U)
The analysis in the previous section shows that the manufacturing ﬁrm has a
strategic motive to put one distributor at a competitive disadvantage and re-
duce the volume of PI. In this section we shall derive the equilibrium under
the assumption that the government forces the producer to charge a uniform
wholesale price. As we noted in the introduction, the government might enforce
a competition law under which wholesale price discrimination is illegal (cf. Ar-
ticle 82 in the EC Treaty or the Robinson-Patman Act). The manufacturing
ﬁrm must therefore set the same wholesale price, wAB, for both distributors.
As in the previous section we consider the possibility that the manufac-
turing ﬁrm could set either a wholesale price that permits cross-border trade
or a wholesale prices that deters it. In an equilibrium with parallel trade the
wholesale price must solve this ﬁrst-order condition









where the ﬁrst term on the left hand side reﬂects the pro-competitive eﬀect of
trade in market A (the horizontal externality), the second term is the eﬀect of
wasteful PI (the ineﬃciency in distribution) and the third term is the potential
double-markup problem in market B (the vertical externality).
For suﬃciently high trade costs, above a threshold e tU(derived below), it
is optimal to set an arbitrage-free wholesale price. In this case, the following
condition must hold
w ≥ 1 − 2t (29)
This constraint is enough to ensure that the wholesale price is arbitrage-free
and the distributor in B does not engage in PI. The equilibrium is presented in
the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Assume that the trade cost is non-prohibitive and the manufac-





4+9 Scb+1 2 c − 2t
9Sb+1 6
for t ≤ e tU, (30)
wU
A = wU
B =1− 2t for t>e tU, (31)
and the equilibrium is unique.
Here, the wholesale price is a continuous decreasing function in the unit
trade cost and the volume of parallel trade for t below the new threshold is
xU
B =
(3Sb+4 )( 1− c) − (10 + 6Sb)t
9Sb+1 6
. (32)






Further, note that e tU > e tD, which shows that PI exist in equilibrium for higher
trade costs than with discriminatory wholesale prices. The intuition for this is
that it is relatively more expensive for the producer to use the uniform wholesale
price to reduce the volume of parallel trade. If the manufacturing ﬁrm is required
to set a uniform price and it increases that price for intermediate and high trade
costs, the result is a double-markup problem in both retail markets. The vertical
control problem is consequently more diﬃcult to solve with a uniform price than
with a discriminatory price.
5W e l f a r e
Competition policy has as its objective to enhance welfare and protect consumer
interests. This section is accordingly devoted to an analysis of consumer surplus
and welfare under discriminatory and uniform pricing. For this purpose we
deﬁne welfare as the sum of aggregated consumer surplus in both markets plus
the manufacturing ﬁrm’s proﬁt. Consumer surplus is uniquely determined by
the retail prices. For a given trade cost and a given marginal cost of production,
the manufacturing ﬁrm’s proﬁt is uniquely determined by retail prices and the
volume of cross-border trade. From a welfare perspective the most interesting
variables are, consequently, the retail prices and the level of parallel imports.
Two conclusions highlight our results. First, for trade costs above a thresh-
17old b t (computed below), the policy of requiring a uniform wholesale price is
Pareto-dominated by market segmentation. The reason is that uniform whole-
sale prices generate higher retail prices in both markets while reducing ﬁrm
proﬁts. This suggests that the policy of not permitting price discrimination,
designed to safeguard wholesale competition, easily could have the unintended
consequence of reducing economic well-being. However, at low trade costs, below
the threshold t0 (computed below), the uniform-price policy can generate gains
in consumer welfare. Thus, it seems that uniform pricing and policies taken
to reduce transactions costs, such as harmonized product standards, could be
complementary.
The welfare rankings between uniform and discriminatory wholesale pricing
are more complex. We describe here the interesting and relevant case where
markets diﬀer noticeably in demand elasticity (e.g., a high value for b), which
ensures that the retail price in market B is below the retail price in market A.





This situation could characterize market conditions when low-income Eastern
European economies join the high-income existing EU members and parallel
trade is unrestricted. In this case we show that the restraint of a uniform
wholesale price diminishes joint consumer welfare for a unit trade cost above
the threshold t0.
To establish these results we ﬁrst derive the retail prices in the discriminatory
pricing equilibrium. We insert the equilibrium wholesale prices (21) and (23) in








S + Scb+2 t
2bS
for t ≤ e tD, (36)
pD
A =








2+2 c + Scb− 4t
2(4+Sb)
for t>e tD, (38)
which are continuous functions in the unit trade cost with kinks at the critical
threshold for arbitrage-free prices, e tD. For illustrative purposes we have plotted
retail prices as functions of the unit trade cost in Figure 1. We also show the
18volume of parallel trade, xD
B.
Note that as the unit trade cost falls from the level supporting exclusive
territories (ET), the gap between retail prices narrows for this intermediate
range of trade costs due to the manufacturing ﬁrm’s incentive to block wasteful
cross-border trade. Accordingly, the threat of parallel trade results in retail
price convergence to some extent. However, this convergence is not due to
ap r o - c o m p e t i t i v ee ﬀect but arises from the manufacturing ﬁrm’s inability to
fully manage the vertical control problem. Once the trade cost falls below the
threshold we ﬁnd that retail prices actually move apart, a result consistent with
that in Ganslandt and Maskus (2007). This stems from the manufacturer’s
incentive to establish diﬀerent wholesale prices (with that in A rising and that
in B falling as t declines) in order to minimize the horizontal externality in the









































Figure 1: Retail prices in the discriminatory wholesale pricing equilibrium (S =
1,b=2 ,c=1 /4)
Next, we derive the retail prices in the uniform pricing equilibrium. We insert
the optimal wholesale price given by (30) and (31) in the sub-game equilibrium
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for t ≤ e tU, (40)
pU








− t for t>e tU, (42)
with kinks at the threshold for the arbitrage-free price in this case. Retail prices










which is below the threshold for arbitrage-free prices. The retail prices as func-
tions of the unit trade cost under uniform wholesale pricing are illustrated in
Figure 2.
There are two interesting features of this equilibrium. First, a uniform whole-
sale price results in retail prices above the segmented price in both markets for
i n t e r m e d i a t ea n dh i g ht r a d ec o s t s( a n di nm a r k e tB throughout the range).
It is optimal for the manufacturing ﬁrm to set a wholesale price that results
in a double-markup problem in both markets in order to minimize the waste
of resources in PI. Second, the volume of cross-border trade with a uniform
wholesale price is a decreasing function in t. The gap between retail prices in
markets A and B is relatively narrow for low trade costs and relatively wide
for higher trade costs. A policy that requires the manufacturing ﬁrm to set
non-discriminatory wholesale prices will thus have a pro-competitive eﬀect in
market A for low trade costs and the eﬀect is some degree of price integration.





















where the ﬁrst term is consumer surplus in A and the second term is consumer
surplus in B. We insert the demand functions in markets A and B to get con-














































which is continuous, concave and decreasing in both pA and pB. The aggre-
gated consumer surplus values under price discrimination and under a uniform
wholesale price are summarized in Table 1.
21Table 1: Total consumer surplus, CS






















































Uniform wholesale pricing, t>e tU :
1








Total consumer surplus functions under discriminatory and uniform whole-
sale pricing are illustrated in Figure 3. The aggregated consumer surplus under
discriminatory pricing has its maximum for intermediate trade costs, where the
retail price gap is relatively narrow. The allocation in the retail markets is
accordingly relatively eﬃcient for the intermediate range of trade costs. The al-
locative ineﬃciency increases and consumer surplus decreases in the retail price
gap. The minimum consumer surplus under discriminatory wholesale pricing
accordingly occurs for zero and prohibitive trade costs, when the equilibrium
retail prices are identical to the retail prices in a segmented equilibrium.
In the uniform wholesale pricing equilibrium, the aggregated consumer sur-
plus has its maximum when the trade cost is zero due to the price-integrating
eﬀect of cross-border trade in that case. Aggregated consumer surplus has its
minimum at the threshold for an arbitrage-free wholesale price, which is close
to the prohibitive trade cost. At this point the double-markup problems in both
markets are most severe and the resulting retail prices are above the prices in
a segmented equilibrium, while the retail price gap is just as wide as in the
segmented equilibrium. There are consequently no oﬀsetting beneﬁts of price
integration.
We see that wholesale price discrimination dominates the uniform wholesale





















Figure 3: Total consumer surplus with discriminatory and uniform wholesale
pricing (S =1 ,b=2 ,c=1 /4)





Consumers are consequently better oﬀ as a group with non-discriminatory prices
if the unit trade cost is low. The intuition for this is straightforward. Cross-
border trade has both a pro-competitive and price-integrating eﬀect for low
trade costs. The narrow gap between retail prices in the two markets has a
positive eﬀect on total consumer surplus due to a relatively moderate allocative
distortion compared to that under discriminatory prices.
Having considered consumer welfare we now proceed to compute the equilib-
rium proﬁt for the manufacturing ﬁrm. We insert wholesale prices in equation
(16) to obtain the proﬁt under discriminatory and uniform wholesale pricing.
The manufacturing ﬁrm’s proﬁt under price discrimination and a uniform whole-
sale price is summarized in Table 2.
23Table 2: The manufacturing ﬁrm’s proﬁt





















Uniform wholesale pricing, t>e tU :
(1 − c − t)t +
S(1+b−2bt−2cb)(1−b+2bt)
4b
Proﬁts under discriminatory and uniform wholesale pricing are illustrated in
Figure 4. The proﬁt of the manufacturing ﬁrm is higher under discriminatory
pricing than uniform pricing for obvious reasons. The ﬁrm has one more instru-
ment to solve the three problems it faces, and it can accordingly set prices that
result in less parallel trade and retail prices closer to the optimal level com-
pared to the constraint it operates under with the uniform wholesale pricing
equilibrium.
The ﬁrm’s proﬁt is a U-shaped function in the trade cost under both discrim-
inatory and uniform wholesale pricing. The proﬁt function under discriminatory
wholesale pricing has its minimum at a relatively low trade cost, i.e.
t =
bS (1 − c)
5bS +4
(47)
At this point the total resources used in cross-border trade are signiﬁcant and
the ineﬃciency in distribution is substantial. Under uniform wholesale pricing































Figure 4: The manufacturing ﬁrm’s proﬁt with discriminatory and uniform
wholesale pricing (S =1 ,b=2 ,c=1 /4)
Finally, total welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and the manufacturing
ﬁrm’s proﬁt. It is illustrated in Figure 5. It is evident that the requirement not
to discriminate in wholesale prices generates higher welfare only at low trade
costs.
6E x t e n s i o n s
The analysis above is based on two important assumptions. One was that, under
the discriminatory wholesale pricing regime, the marginal cost of production is
suﬃciently high to permit the manufacturing ﬁrm to subsidize the distributor
in market A with a wholesale price below the marginal cost of production for
some trade costs. Another was that retail markets are segmented. We assumed
that the distributor (or his agent) is prohibited from buying the good in one
retail market and shipping it to the other market. In this section we extend our



































Figure 5: Welfare with discriminatory and uniform wholesale pricing (S =1 ,b=
2,c=1 /4)
6.1 Wholesale Pricing At or Above Marginal Cost (C)
We noted above that for some trade costs the manufacturing ﬁrm has a strategic
incentive to subsidize the local distributor in the import market in order to
make it more aggressive and take market share from the importing distributor.
This subsidization involves a wholesale price that is below the marginal cost of
production.
Now consider the possibility that the manufacturing ﬁrm cannot subsidize
the distributor in market A. For instance, the competition authorities may im-
pose a restriction that the manufacturing ﬁrm must charge a wholesale price
that covers its marginal cost of production or the marginal cost of production
may be close to zero, thus restricting the scope for subsidization. This might be
called a policy of "non-exclusionary" pricing for it precludes the manufacturer
from subsidizing one distributor to the exclusion of the other.
The optimal wholesale price in market B that permits parallel trade can
be found by solving the ﬁrst-order condition subject to the binding restriction
26wA = c, i.e.









where the wholesale price in A is simply replaced by the marginal cost of pro-
duction. Since the binding restriction on the wholesale price in market A pushes
that price above the optimal level, the manufacturing ﬁrm must use the whole-
sale price in market B to reduce the volume of cross-border trade. This forces
the manufacturing ﬁrm to charge a higher price to the local distributor in B,
which exacerbates the double-markup problem there.
For suﬃciently high trade costs, above the critical threshold e tC,i ti so p t i m a l
for the manufacturing ﬁrm to block cross-border trade. Arbitrage-free wholesale





and we have the following result:
Proposition 3 Assume that the trade cost is non-prohibitive and wholesale
prices must be above or equal to the marginal cost of production. Then the
equilibrium wholesale prices are
wC
























and the equilibrium is unique.
The assumption that wholesale prices must be non-exclusionary is binding
for intermediate and high trade costs, t ≥ e tS,g i v e nb y(27). In the intermediate
range the volume of parallel trade is
xC
B =
3Sb(1 − c) − (8 + 6Sb)t
4+9 Sb
(53)
which is strictly more than the volume of such trade when the manufacturing
ﬁrm sets a subsidized price to the distributor in market A.T h i si sn o ts u r p r i s i n g
since the manufacturing ﬁrm essentially lost one control instrument (wA). Par-
allel trade consequently occurs in equilibrium for a wider range of trade costs.







which is strictly higher than the threshold with price discrimination (e tD). The
eﬀect of a policy that bans subsidies by precluding wholesale prices below mar-
ginal cost is, consequently, an increased volume of PI for a wider range of trade
costs.
We insert the equilibrium wholesale prices (51) and (52) into the sub-game
equilibrium (11) and (12) to obtain the retail prices as functions of the unit























































Figure 6: Retail prices in an equilibrium with wholesale prices at or above
marginal cost (S =1 ,b=2 ,c=1 /4)
For high trade costs, i.e. t>e tC, wholesale prices that are at or above
marginal cost are Pareto-dominated by discriminatory wholesale pricing. Con-
sumers in market A, consumers in market B and the manufacturing ﬁrm are
28all worse oﬀ. This result stems from the manufacturing ﬁrm’s market power.
A restriction on prices in a market with imperfect competition can generate
signiﬁcant distortions that make the equilibrium substantially less eﬃcient. In
our case the manufacturing ﬁrm must use the wholesale price in B to reduce the
scope for costly cross-border trade. The eﬀect is that the retail prices increase
in both markets. Consumption accordingly moves away from what would be the
ﬁrst-best solution for the manufacturing ﬁrm, i.e. the segmented equilibrium,
and both consumers and the manufacturing ﬁrm lose as a result.
6.2 Retail arbitrage
We initially assumed that retail markets are segmented. While we think this is a
relevant assumption in many cases, readers may wonder about the implications
of retail arbitrage in the model. For this purpose, consider the possibility that
the distributor in market A (or an agent) can import the product from B.
Arbitrage by distributor A (in which he buys at the retail level abroad in order
to ﬁnd a cheaper source of supply than the available wholesale price) is not
proﬁtable if the margin between the wholesale price in market A and the retail
price in market B is lower than the unit trade cost t. Formally, the no-arbitrage
condition is
wA ≤ pB + t (55)
and in order to determine whether this condition is slack in equilibrium we insert
the accommodation wholesale price in market A a n dt h er e t a i lp r i c ei nm a r k e t
B. The critical threshold for retail markets to be segmented in this case is
e tR =
S (b − 1)
6+7 Sb
, (56)
which is close to zero for b close to 1. Markets are consequently segmented at
the retail level by the natural barrier t for intermediate and high trade costs, i.e.
t ≥ e tR. However, if markets are diﬀerent in terms of price elasticity, then retail
arbitrage would limit the scope for price discrimination at low trade costs, i.e.
t<e tR.
A second possibility might be arbitrage by ﬁnal consumers. However, perfect
consumer retail arbitrage is a strong assumption and inconsistent both with the
fact that the bulk of PI occurs at the distributor level and with persistent dif-
ferences in retail prices within the EU. There are good reasons to expect limited
arbitrage of this kind even without restrictions on parallel trade. First, as noted
29above there are likely to be complementarities in retail services that cannot be
provided by arbitrageurs. Second, there may be signiﬁcant ﬁxed costs in orga-
nizing cross-border retail trade. Third, there may be large information costs
for consumers in determining product prices and characteristics for purposes of
organizing arbitrage. Thus, we think our analysis of distributor-level PI is valid
in the bulk of realistic circumstances.
7T w o - W a y C r o s s - B o r d e r T r a d e
In this section we modify our model and permit two-way trade. Thus, we analyze
the possibility of parallel imports into market A from market B and vice versa.
We restrict our attention to the cases of wholesale price discrimination and
an enforced uniform wholesale price. The distributors non-cooperatively set
quantities in a Cournot-fashion in the two markets. A sub-game equilibrium in
market B with cross-border trade from A to B is therefore
yA =




S (1 − 2wBb + wAb + tb)
3
, (58)
while the sub-game equilibrium in A, with cross-border trade from B to A,
is given by the optimal quantities (8) and (9). The manufacturing ﬁrm sets
wholesale prices to maximize total proﬁts
max
wA,wB
X (w)(pA (w) − c)+Y (w)(pB (w) − c) − t(xB + yA), (59)
where the last term on the right hand side is the resources used in cross-border
trade.
First, consider wholesale price discrimination. Prices block arbitrage from
A to B if
pB ≤ wA + t (60)
for then cross-border trade in that direction would be unproﬁtable. It follows
that the manufacturing ﬁrm can set the discriminatory wholesale prices given
by (21) and (22),f o rs u ﬃciently low trade costs, since these prices would block
trade from A to B. More speciﬁcally, these prices are arbitrage-free as long as






Above this threshold two-way trade could potentially occur. However, it re-
mains proﬁtable for the manufacturing ﬁrm to set wholesale prices that actually
eliminate trade from A to B. Indeed, permitting two-way trade can never be
proﬁtable if the manufacturing ﬁrm can set discriminatory wholesale prices. If
two-way arbitrage occurred the manufacturing ﬁrm could induce the same retail
prices (remember that wholesale prices are perfect substitutes for this purpose)
and reduce the total volume of cross-border trade by increasing wA and de-
creasing wB. Thus, two-way parallel trade does not occur in equilibrium with
discriminatory prices. Accordingly, the producer chooses wholesale prices that
are arbitrage-free and solve the following equation
S (1 + wBb − 2wAb − 2tb)
3
=0 . (62)
It follows that the ﬁrst-order condition is









where the ﬁrst term reﬂects the horizontal externality in market A, the second
term reﬂects the vertical externality in market B a n dt h et h i r dt e r mr e ﬂects the


















In this situation there remains one-way parallel trade from B to A and its
volume decreases in t, becoming zero if the trade cost is above the threshold
e tD2
2 =
2+2 b2S + b + Sb− 3Sb2c − 3bc
3b(3 + 2Sb)
. (66)
For trade costs above this threshold, the manufacturing ﬁrm can block trade in
both directions. It sets wholesale prices such that xA =0and yB =0 ,w h e r e







1+2 b − 6tb
3b
. (68)
Finally, two-way trade is blocked for high trade costs and the discriminatory




4+2 b − 6cb − 3Sb2c + Sb+2 Sb2
6b(2 + Sb)
(69)
above which two-way cross-border trade is no longer a binding restriction for
the manufacturing ﬁrm.
The wholesale and corresponding retail prices under wholesale price discrim-
ination and two-way trade are illustrated in Figure 7. Two-way parallel trade
changes the equilibrium wholesale prices for intermediate trade costs between
the thresholds e tD2
1 and e tD2
3 .
Next, consider the equilibrium with a uniform wholesale price. In this case
two-way trade is potentially proﬁtable for low trade costs. The ﬁrst-order con-
dition for the manufacturing ﬁrm is






2S (1 − 4wb − 2tb +3 cb)
9
=0 (70)
and the optimal wholesale price is
w =
2+6 c +2 S +6 Scb− t − tSb
8(1+Sb)
(71)
and the equilibrium is unique. The volume of trade from A to B, i.e. yA,










Above this threshold, the manufacturing ﬁrm consequently blocks trade from A
to B by solving
yA =































































Figure 7: Wholesale and retail prices with price discrimination and two-way
parallel trade (S =1 ,b=2 ,c=1 /4)





This wholesale price quickly approaches the optimal uniform wholesale price




9Sb+1 6− 4b − 9Sb2c − 12bc
6b(5 + 3Sb)
. (75)
Above this threshold, trade from A to B is blocked by the unit trade cost and
the manufacturing ﬁrm can set the same uniform wholesale price as with one-
way trade, i.e. the equilibrium given by (30) and (31). The wholesale price is
arbitrage-free for any trade cost greater than
e tU2




33The uniform wholesale price and the corresponding retail prices are plotted
in Figure 8. It is worth noting that retail prices are higher in both markets
with two-way trade, i.e. for t<e tU2
2 , compared to the retail prices with one-way
trade, pU
A.and pU
B (not shown in Figure 8). Here, the restriction that there be a
single uniform price makes it yet harder for the manufacturer to limit the cost
















































Figure 8: Retail prices and the uniform wholesale price with two-way parallel
trade (S =1 ,b=2 ,c=1 /4)
8C o n c l u s i o n
We developed a model in which a manufacturing ﬁrm owns an intellectual prop-
erty right in two markets but its ability to limit parallel imports from one market
to the other is exhausted. In this environment, the ﬁrm has the ability to set
wholesale prices - either discriminatory or uniform depending on the regula-
tory regime - to its independent distributors in the two locations. It will use
34its available instruments to maximize proﬁts within the vertical price control
framework. There are three essential trade-oﬀs for the manufacturer. It wishes
to restrict the extent of competition from parallel imports in market A (a hor-
izontal externality), limit the amount of trade because it wastes real resources
in transport costs (ineﬃcient distribution), and avoid the double-markup prob-
lem in market B arising from the inability to set an eﬃcient wholesale price (a
vertical externality).
We considered two principal policy regimes: a discriminatory pricing regime
permitting varying wholesale prices for each distributor and a uniform pricing
regime forcing the manufacturing ﬁrm to set a common wholesale price for all
distributors. We also analyze a regime that requires the manufacturing ﬁrm to
set wholesale prices that cover the marginal cost of production, .
Our analysis turned up some interesting results. The equilibrium analysis
shows that discriminatory pricing, on the one hand, may result in partial retail
price divergence for low and high trade costs. The incentive to minimize the
resources wasted in trade activities by reducing the retail price gap between
markets counteracts the underlying incentive to induce diﬀerent retail prices
in the two markets. The problem with ineﬃcient distribution is particularly
severe for intermediate trade costs since the trade barrier does not block parallel
i m p o r t sb u tr e d u c e sr e v e n u e ss i g n i ﬁcantly. Uniform pricing, on the other hand,
results in retail prices higher than the monopoly level for high trade costs, close
to the prohibitive level. For high trade costs the manufacturing ﬁrm has a
strong incentive to impede parallel imports, but in order to achieve this goal
the ﬁrm must raise retail prices in both markets. In contrast, for low trade costs
it results in price convergence as well as a pro-competitive eﬀect in the import
market. The manufacturing ﬁrm is willing to accept a larger volume of parallel
imports and the pro-competitive eﬀect in market A is substantial.
The welfare analysis shows that, depending on circumstances, either dis-
criminatory pricing or uniform pricing may be more beneﬁcial. This ﬁnding has
important implications for competition policy. A regulation that makes price
discrimination illegal per se if it impedes parallel imports may not be optimal.
Requiring the manufacturing ﬁrm to charge a uniform wholesale price may be
optimal for low trade costs when the pro-competitive eﬀect is substantial but
m a yh a v eas e v e r en e g a t i v ee ﬀect on consumer welfare when trade costs are
high as the primary eﬀect is that retail prices increase in all markets. Further,
when there is a possibility of two-way parallel trade the uniform-price restriction
can raise retail prices at even low trade costs. These consequences, presumably
35unintended, of the pricing restraint suggests that an eﬀects-based approach in
competition policy is advisable under these circumstances.
Last, but not least, the welfare analysis show that market integration and
competition law may be important complements in a policy perspective. This
complementarity works both ways for low and intermediate trade costs. A re-
duced unit trade cost makes uniform pricing more attractive for consumers.
Correspondingly, adopting a uniform pricing regime enhances the welfare incen-
tives to continue the gradual dismantling of trade barriers.
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